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Abstract 
 
The Timed Antagonistic Response Alethiometer (TARA) is a true-false statement 
classification task that diagnoses lying on the basis of slower average response 
speeds. Previous research (Gregg, 2007) found that a computer-based TARA was 
about 80% accurate when its statements conveyed demographic facts or religious 
views. Here, we tested the TARA’s diagnostic potential when its statements conveyed 
attitudes—here, towards both branded and generic consumer products—across 
different versions of the TARA (Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c), as well as across 
consecutive administrations (Experiment 2). Results generalized well across versions, 
and maximal accuracy rates exceeding 80% were obtained, although accuracy 
declined somewhat upon re-administration.  Overall, the TARA shows promise as a 
comparatively cheap, convenient, and diagnostic index of lying about attitudes. 
Keywords: TARA, lie detection, response speed, IAT, aIAT 
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Detecting Lies about Consumer Attitudes using 
the Timed Antagonistic Response Alethiometer 
People’s intuitive capacity to detect lies is poor (Bond & DePaulo 2006, 
2008). Hence, better technological alternatives have been sought. Chief among them 
is polygraphy, either in the form of the Control Question Test (CQT: Honts, Raskin, 
& Kircher, 2002), or the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT: Lykken, 1998). Here, marked 
physiological arousal—driven by fabricating false answers or by cognizing correct 
ones—signals lying. However, both techniques have problems. For example, the CQT 
is arguably insufficiently specific (Moore, Petrie, & Braga, 2003), and the GKT, 
insufficiently sensitive (Vrij, 2008). More basically, both are relatively cumbersome 
and costly to administer, making them unsuitable for use in survey research.  
Yet lying occurs in surveys too. One common cause is social desirability bias 
(Paulhus, 2002; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), when sensitive 
topics are being researched (Tourangeau & Ting, 2007). Even if social desirability is 
usually greater face-to-face (Christian, Dillman, & Smyth, 2008), lying still occurs 
online (e.g., about credit history; Karlan & Zinman, 2008), and may even be likelier 
online despite anonymity being assured (Naquina, Kurtzbergb, & Belkinc, 2010). 
Hence, some alternative method of detecting lying on surveys—that delivers 
at least conventional levels of diagnostic accuracy while at the same time being both 
cheaper and handier to administer—would be welcome. 
Response Speed as an Index of Deception 
  Whereas the CQT and GKT capitalize on physiological reactions to the 
recognized truth or falsity of assertions, it is also possible to capitalize on how long it 
takes to generate or process such assertions. That is, response speed may also 
diagnose lying. Recent research—going beyond conflicting prior meta-analyses 
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(DePaulo et al., 2003; Sporer & Schwandt, 2006)—now abundantly confirms that, 
when responding to direct inquiries in a structured manner, people take longer on 
average to lie than to tell the truth (Gregg, 2007; Holden, 1998; Sheridan & Flowers, 
2010; Walczyk, Schwartz, Clifton, Adams, Wei, & Zha, 2005; Vendemia, Buzan, & 
Green, 2005). The underlying reason is cognitive: telling a lie, all else equal, requires 
more processing resources than telling the truth—resources devoted, amongst other 
things, to deciding to lie and to constructing a falsehood (Walczyk et al., 2005). 
Consistent with this account, imposing a cognitive load—say by having respondents 
recount a narrative backwards rather than forwards (Vrij et al., 2008)—permits liars to 
be better differentiated from truth-tellers (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011).  
 However, a workable lie detector must discriminate between lying and truth-
telling, not only statistically, but also sensitively. Although the effect sizes yielded by 
simple response speed techniques may be conventionally large (e.g., Cohen’s ds 39 to 
.90; see Gregg, 2007, p. 638), they often entail only modest diagnostic accuracy. 
Moreover, such techniques are susceptible to countermeasures (Robie et al., 2000), 
and may not detect lies that are well-rehearsed (DePaulo et al., 2003) or that concern 
mundane facts (Sporer & Schwandt, 2006). Furthermore, although more accurate 
GKTs incorporating response speed have been devised (e.g., Verschuere, Crombez, 
Degrootte, & Rosseel, 2010), the detection of concealed information is mainly of 
forensic interest. Accordingly, a more general-purpose lie detector based on response 
speed, and affording high levels of discrimination, is still desirable. Gregg (2007) 
sought to devise one: the Timed Antagonistic Response Alethiometer, or TARA. 
The Timed Antagonistic Response Alethiometer (TARA) 
The TARA works by making lying about some target topic harder than telling 
the truth about it. Everything else equal, lying must then take longer than telling the 
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truth. The resulting difference in average response speed differentiates liars from 
truth-tellers. Importantly, the TARA does not merely capitalize upon the fact that 
spontaneous lying is harder than spontaneous truth-telling. Rather, it manufactures an 
artificial situation in which lying becomes harder than truth-telling.  
TARA respondents complete two tasks simultaneously. For truth-tellers, these 
tasks are compatible. For liars, however, these tasks are incompatible. Hence, the two 
tasks comprising the TARA are harder for liars to complete than for truth-tellers. 
Because respondents must complete both tasks accurately, and accuracy is achieved at 
the expense of speed (Wickelgren, 1973), liars must proceed more slowly than truth-
tellers, all else equal.  
Procedurally, the TARA takes the form of a binary classification task. 
Respondents classify statements into the categories True and False. On computer, this 
entails pressing one of two keys whenever a statement appears. The key on the right 
corresponds to True, the key on the left to False. On-screen labels, on the same side 
as the relevant keys, reinforce these correspondences. 
Respondents classify, on alternate trials, two different types of statement, 
control and target. The classification of each type of statement constitutes a separate 
task. In effect, then, respondents complete two tasks simultaneously. Depending on 
the classification strategy adopted, these tasks then end up being either compatible or 
incompatible. 
Control statements are obviously true or false (e.g., 1 is a number / 1 is a 
letter). Barring accidental errors, no normal adult could plausibly misclassify them. 
Hence, truth-tellers and will classify all such statements identically. Control 
statements have nothing to do with the topic under investigation. In contrast, target 
statements pertain directly to that topic. Furthermore, truth-tellers and liars classify 
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such statements differently. Consider the statements I am X and I am not X. The truth 
of either statement entails the falsity of the other. Hence, for every respondent, one 
statement will be true and the other false. However, truth-tellers and liars differ in 
which statements they indicate to be true or false. Among respondents who really are 
X, truth-tellers classify I am X as true and I am not X as false, whereas liars do the 
reverse. Similarly, among respondents who really are not X, truth-tellers classify I am 
not X as true and I am X, whereas again liars do the reverse. In both cases, the truth-
tellers classify the true statement as true and the false statement as false, whereas liars 
classify the true statement as false and the false statement as true.
1
  
Here, then, is the overall situation artificially manufactured by the TARA. 
Truth-tellers classify both control and target statements “the right way”. In contrast, 
liars classify control statements “the right way” but target statements “the wrong 
way”. Thus, on alternate trials, truth-tellers can adopt a consistent statement 
classification strategy—if true, indicate true; if false, indicate false. However, liars 
must adopt two inconsistent strategies, one for control statements—if true, indicate 
true; if false, indicate false—and another for target statements—if true, indicate false; 
if false, indicate true. The processing load imposed by having to switch strategy on 
alternate trials makes lying on the TARA more cognitively demanding than truth-
telling. Given that respondents are instructed to classify the statements without 
making errors, the difference in cognitive demand results in a difference in average 
response speed, permitting liars and truth-tellers to be empirically distinguished. 
Such is the theory. How well does the TARA work in practice? Gregg (2007) 
assessed its capacity to distinguish between the honest and dishonest reporting of 
personal details (e.g., age, gender). The TARA successfully did so (a) within the same 
group of participants (Study 1), and (b) between different groups of participants 
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Detecting Lies about Attitudes 7 
(Study 2). In Study 1, every participant took longer when responding dishonestly than 
when responding honestly. In Study 2, levels of discriminative accuracy ranged from 
79% to 100%, and Cohen’s ds for the differences, from 2.47 to 2.89. Comparable 
values were obtained in a follow-up study concerning religious faith.  
The Present Research: An “Attitudinal” Variant of the TARA 
Gregg (2007) established that the TARA could distinguish between the honest 
or dishonest reporting of beliefs people had about themselves. Here, the task featured 
target statements linking an object (e.g., the self) with some semantic attribute (e.g., is 
male / female). But can the TARA equally distinguish between the honest or 
dishonest reporting of evaluations people have about attitude objects? Here, the task 
would feature target statements linking an object (e.g., a consumer product) with 
some valenced attribute (e.g., is positive / negative). If so, then the TARA might find 
a useful application in survey research, where opinions about issues are investigated 
as often as facts about self, and where honest responding cannot always be assured.  
For example, in the consumer domain, the desire to create a good 
impression—which is already known to prompt unhealthy behaviors (Leary, 
Tchividjian, & Kraxberger, 1994)—might equally prompt deceptive reports, for 
example, false denials of liking tempting but unhealthy foods (e.g., hamburgers), or 
false affirmations of liking bland but healthy foods (e.g., broccoli). Equally, frank 
reporting of liking for products such illegal drugs or sexual aids is hardly guaranteed. 
Furthermore, correlations with standard measures of social desirability bias in market 
research do not always control for it, and attempts to do so may even reduce validity 
(Steenkamp, de Jong, & Baumgartner, 2010). 
It bears mention that researchers have attempted to address lying about 
attitudes in two other noteworthy ways. First, they have attempted to facilitate the 
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Detecting Lies about Attitudes 8 
honest reporting of attitudes by falsely convincing respondents that they are hooked 
up to an infallible lie detector (i.e., via the “bogus pipeline” procedure; Jones & 
Sigall, 1971). Second, they have attempted to detect, by various indirect means, the 
underlying positive and negative valences that respondents associate with targets, 
thereby circumventing self-reports (i.e., via “implicit measures”; Wittenbrink & 
Schwarz, 2007). Both methods have met with partial success: the bogus pipeline 
reduces socially desirable responding (Roese & Jamieson, 1993) and implicit 
measures of attitude predict behavior above and beyond self-reports (Greenwald, 
Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). However, neither method diagnoses lying 
about attitudes per se. Moreover, the bogus pipeline is as unwieldy as a bona fide 
polygraph, and underlying associations need not correspond to conscious evaluations 
(Gawronski, 2009). Accordingly, an “attitudinal” TARA would still be a useful 
addition to a survey researcher’s toolkit. 
Experiment 1 
In our first experiment, we tested whether and to what extent the TARA can 
detect whether participants are lying or telling the truth about the attitudes they hold. 
For simplicity and relevance, we choose a consumer product as an attitude object. In 
addition, we tested not just one “attitudinal” TARA, but three versions of it: one 
version conducted on computer (Experiment 1a); another making use of paper-and-
pencil materials (Experiment 1b); and a third involving the sorting of playing cards 
(Experiment 1c). We reasoned that positive and comparable findings across all three 
versions would testify to the validity and robustness of the TARA’s modus operandi, 
as well as to its flexibility in deployment. 
Method 
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Detecting Lies about Attitudes 9 
Consumer product. To assess the diagnostic accuracy of the proposed 
“attitudinal” TARA it was essential for us to establish the ground truth about 
participants’ attitudes. Hence, we selected a consumer product towards which it could 
be assumed with near certainty that participants would reveal their true attitudes. We 
also selected a product that participants would not only be familiar with, but might 
tend either to strongly like or to strongly dislike, to test our hypothesis cleanly. 
To satisfy both desiderata, we selected Marmite
TM
. This is a classic British 
food spread, sold in small jars—a sticky, dark-brown paste possessing a distinctive 
flavour, both salty and savoury. No shame attaches to liking or disliking it: having 
either reaction is considered a matter of personal taste. Nonetheless, evaluations of 
Marmite
TM
 are reputedly polarized: the product is marketed under the slogan “love it 
or hate it”. As such, it was a convenient product with which to test the “attitudinal” 
TARA, likely to yield comparable numbers of lovers and haters. 
Participants and recruitment. Participants in Experiment 1a comprised 
mainly undergraduate psychology students at the University of Southampton, UK, 
taking part for course credit. They completed a computer-based TARA, programmed 
in Authorware 7.0 (2000), and hosted online at http://www.mindstudies.org/. Full 
instructions were provided, and participants completed it at their own discretion. 
 Participants in Experiment 1b comprised volunteers recruited at a public 
library in Kenilworth, UK. They completed a paper-and-pencil TARA—a booklet 
containing ten A4-size pages—with a rollerball pen, leaning on a table, seated in a 
quiet corner, guided by the experimenter. 
Participants in Experiment 1c mainly comprised undergraduate students at the 
University of Southampton, UK, who volunteered to take part. They completed the 
card-sorting task on a table in a quiet location on campus, guided by the experimenter. 
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Detecting Lies about Attitudes 10 
The number of participants, and percentages of males, in Experiments 1a, 1b, 
and 1c, were respectively 135 (25%), 60 (42%), and 65 (45%). In addition, the means 
(and standard deviations) of participants’ ages were respectively 22.8 (8.7), 23.8 (8.2), 
and 25.7 (9.8). Demographic information was collected in advance of completing the 
TARA. 
Format, content, and design. The format, content, and design of Experiments 
1a, 1b, and 1c were identical or near-identical. 
First, after providing demographic information participants in all experiments 
indicated accurately (a) whether they liked or disliked Marmite
TM
—by dichotomously 
indicating one or the other—and (b) how much they liked or disliked Marmite
TM
–by 
rating their degree of liking for or dislike of it on a scale ranging from 1 (I hate 
Marmite) to 7 (I love Marmite). 
Second, the TARAs in all three experiments featured the same two category 
pairs (True, False) and the same two sets of items (i.e., six target statements and six 
control statements: see Appendix, upper). The target statements were thematically 
homogeneous: the three items asserting liking for Marmite
TM
 were semantically 
equivalent; the three items asserting dislike for Marmite
TM
 were semantically 
equivalent; and the former meant the exact opposite of the latter.
2
 
Third, each TARA consisted of 48 trials, such that items appeared in the same 
pseudo-random order for all participants (see Appendix, lower). This order satisfied 
four constraints simultaneously: (a) target statements always alternated with control 
statements; (b) all 12 basic statements appeared before any one reappeared; (c) no two 
identical statements appeared sequentially with fewer than three intervening items, 
and (d) no more than three statements belonging to the same category appeared 
sequentially (whether lying or telling the truth). The first constraint served to 
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Detecting Lies about Attitudes 11 
maximize response incompatibility when lying. Subsequent constraints served to 
prevent items from clumping together in a manner that might facilitate responding 
independently of levels of response incompatibility. 
Fourth, all three experiments featured the same design. In each experiment 
participants completed practice trials, to familiar themselves with the procedure, and 
to ensure that they regarded both control and target statements as coherent units. They 
then completed the same TARA twice: once honestly, and once dishonestly. In each 
case, participants were told to proceed as quickly as they could without making errors, 
but to ignore any errors if they made them and to proceed to the next trial (trials 
advanced automatically in Experiment 1a). Order of honest and dishonest TARAs was 
counterbalanced across participants. In addition, the items to be classified appeared in 
“forwards” order the first time around (i.e., A-to-Z), but in “backwards” order the 
second time around (i.e., Z-to-A). This flipping around of item order prevented the 
pseudo-random sequence from being learned in the interim.  
The key index for each TARA was mean response speed per trial. In 
Experiment 1a, the computer program automatically recorded response speeds for all 
48 key presses. In Experiments 1b and 1c, the experimenter recorded by stopwatch 
how long it took participants to check all 48 boxes, or to sort all 48 cards, 
respectively. In addition, to avoid exclusion, participants also had to attain a 
satisfactory level of classification accuracy in both TARAs: 75% or greater.  
Mean response speeds across different TARAs were then compared with a 
view to (a) establishing whether or not the new “attitudinal” TARA worked in 
principle—by testing for within-subject differences on the honest and dishonest 
TARAs; and (b) estimating how accurately the new “attitudinal” TARA might 
distinguish liars from truth-tellers in practice—by testing for between-subject 
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Detecting Lies about Attitudes 12 
differences on honest and dishonest TARAs. Note that the latter difference could be 
tested for twice, given that all participants completed two TARAs. 
Procedure and materials.  
In Experiment 1a, participants classified on-screen statements, located in the 
center of the display, by pressing keys on either side of a keyboard. In Experiment 1b, 
participants classified printed statements, arranged as a vertical list, by checking 
adjacent boxes on either side of a page. In Experiment 1c, participants classified 
statements on cards, located in a hand-held deck, into discard piles on either side of a 
table. (Figure 1 features photographs of the relevant materials.) In all cases, a 
rightward response indicated (whether honestly or dishonestly) that a statement was 
true, a leftward response that it was false. This correspondence was reinforced in each 
case by having permanent labels for True and False located above the statements to 
be classified (on the computer screen, booklet page, or table). 
Finally, various procedural niceties served to optimize the measurement of 
response speed. For example, in Experiment 1a, before beginning each TARA, 
participants were reminded to place the fingers of either hand directly over the 
response keys, to facilitate rapid responding. In Experiments 1b and 1c, each TARA 
began with a verbal countdown, and ended with participants saying “done”, to 
facilitate the accurate stopping and starting of the stopwatch. 
Results 
Data cleaning and reduction. In Experiment 1a, 26 participants (19%) were 
excluded for one or more of the following reasons: 5 for rating Marmite
TM
 at the scale 
midpoint; 10 for being non-native English speakers; and 15 for completing a TARA 
more than once (having made too many errors). In Experiment 1b, 7 participants 
(12%) were excluded: 3 for rating Marmite
TM
 at the scale midpoint; 1 for being a non-
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Detecting Lies about Attitudes 13 
native English speaker; and 4 for making too many errors in either TARA. In 
Experiment 1c, 6 participants (9%) were excluded: 2 for rating Marmite
TM
 at the scale 
midpoint; and 4 for dropping at least one card in either TARA.  
Given the nature of materials, data were available at the level of individual 
trials Experiment 1a, but not in Experiments 1b and 1c. To maximize comparability 
across all three TARAs, response times from the TARA in Experiment 1a were only 
lightly processed. Obvious outliers on individual trials (< 350 ms or > 6000 ms) were 
replaced by the median response time across trials, but no nonlinear transformations 
were performed. Data from trials on which erroneous classifications were made were 
also retained. Mean response time to classify statements (i.e., total time taken / 48) 
served as the index of TARA performance in all experiments.  
No response time penalties were applied in proportion to the number of 
classification errors made because the latter did not correlate significantly negatively 
with mean response time, either in Experiment 1a (rHONEST[107]= -.13, p = .17; 
rDISHONEST[107] = .14, p = .14), in Experiment 1b (rHONEST[51]= .15, p = .30; 
rDISHONEST[51] = .18, p = .20), or in Experiment 1c (rHONEST[57]= .21, p = .10; 
rDISHONEST[57] = .29, p = .03). If anything, the trend, at least in dishonest TARAs, 
suggests slower speeds and lesser accuracy covary positively rather than trade off.  
Attitudes towards Marmite
TM
.  Consistent with popular lore, ratings of 
Marmite
TM
 exhibited a bimodal distribution in all three experiments (see Figure 2, 
top). In none of the three experiments, however, did participants show any overall 
evaluative bias for or against Marmite
TM
 (Experiment 1a: t[108] = 1.25, p = .21; 
Experiment 1b:  t[52] = -.92, p = .36; Experiment 1c: t[58] = -1.26, p = .21).  
Within-subject differences.  
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Detecting Lies about Attitudes 14 
Overall effects. In all three experiments, the same set of participants took 
significantly (all ps < .0001) and substantially (all ds > 1.11) longer to complete the 
TARA when lying about their attitudes towards Marmite
TM
 than when telling the truth 
about them (Table 1, upper). Thus, the “attitudinal” TARA worked in principle: 
regardless of the materials used to run it, the vast majority of participants exhibited 
the predicted effect. In terms of effect size, the paper-and-pencil version modestly 
exceeded the computer version, which modestly exceeded the card-sorting version. 
Furthermore, participants made slightly more errors in the dishonest TARA 
than in the honest TARA, consistent with slower speeds and lower accuracy both 
reflecting processing difficulty (Experiment 1a: respective Ms = 3.50, 1.74, t [108]= 
5.70, p < .0005; Experiment 1b: respective Ms =  .87, .25, t [52]= 3.40, p < .001; 
respective Ms =  2.31, .73, t [58]= 5.95, p < .0005). Nonetheless, accuracy rates were 
very high across the board, even in dishonest TARAs (i.e., 93%, 98%, and 95% across 
Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c). This has implications for the nature of the mechanism 
underlying TARA effects. It means that the overall response speed effects, reported 
above, cannot plausibly be ascribed, wholly or mainly, to greater cognitive confusion 
regarding how to respond in dishonest TARAs than in ho est TARAs. More 
plausibly, participants understood equally well what to do in dishonest TARAs, but 
found it objectively more difficult to do it, and accordingly went more slowly. Their 
occasional errors can be better put down to their complying only imperfectly with the 
instruction to avoid errors. Backing up this interpretation, even among those 
participants who made zero errors—and so who could not conceivably be described as 
confused—significant within-subject differences between TARAs emerged, despite 
such participants being far fewer in number (Experiment 1a: MDIFF = 464 ms, t[4]= 
2.68, p = .055; Experiment 1b: MDIFF = 495 ms, t[23]= 8.06, p < .0005; Experiment 
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1c: MDIFF = 576 ms, t[10]= 3.82, p < .005). Moreover, participants who did, or did 
not, make errors, showed equivalent within-subject differences between TARAs 
(Experiment 1a: t[107]= -.42, p = .67; Experiment 1b: t[51]= .33, p = .75; Experiment 
1c: t[57]= .72, p = .47). 
Moderation tests. We tested whether gender (coded female = 0, male = 1), age 
(in years), attitude towards target (coded 1 to 7), and the extremity of that attitude 
(coded 1 to 3) moderated average response speed for both the honest and dishonest 
TARAs, as well as for the within-subject difference between them (Table 2, upper).  
No variable significantly moderated the within-subject difference. Greater age 
predicted numerically slower responses on all indices, which attained significance for 
both the honest and dishonest computer-based TARAs (as in Gregg, 2007), and for 
the dishonest card-sorting TARA. In addition, males, and dislikers of Marmite
TM
, 
completed the honest computer-based TARA more slowly; but gender and attitude 
towards Marmite
TM
 predicted no other effects. Interestingly, extremity of attitudes 
towards the Marmite
TM
 did not significantly predict performance on any TARA. This 
suggests that, at least for Marmite
TM
, whether one tells the truth or tells a lie may 
matter more than the magnitude of the truth or lie one tells. 
Between-subject differences. 
Overall effects. In all three experiments, as predicted, sets of participants who 
lied about their attitudes towards Marmite
TM
 took longer to complete the TARA than 
matched sets participants who told the truth about them (Table 3, upper). The 
difference was significant and substantial both for the TARA completed first (all ps < 
.0005, all ds > 1.57) and for the TARA completed second (all ps < .001, all ds > 1.00). 
Thus, the “attitudinal” TARA showed promise as a tool to be used in practice: 
regardless of the materials used to run it, sizeable diagnostic differences emerged 
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between liars and truth-tellers. In terms of effect size, the paper-and-pencil and 
computer versions modestly exceeded the card-sorting version. 
Percentage accuracy. The conventional way to quantify the diagnosticity of a 
lie detector is in terms of its percentage accuracy when discriminating liars from 
truth-tellers. This overall value is typically broken down further into four component 
values: true positives (i.e., percentage of liars correctly marked as liars: “hits”), false 
positives (i.e., percentage of truth-tellers mistakenly marked as liars: “false alarms”), 
true negatives (i.e., percentage of truth-tellers correctly marked as truth-tellers: 
“correct rejections”), and false negatives (i.e., percentage of liars mistakenly marked 
as truth-tellers: “misses”). In the absence of a separate empirical investigation— 
where diagnosticity would be directly assessed in a given sample against a preset 
criterion—percentage accuracy and its component values can be estimated by 
simulation from existing data. 
The estimation method we chose was a straightforward leave-one-out 
simulation. On each iteration, we randomly selected, with replacement, one 
participant as the target whose status as a liar or truth-teller was to be inferred. The 
remainder of the sample was then divided into two groups: liars and truth-tellers. We 
calculated the grand mean of the mean response times for both. The mean of these 
two grand means—a value falling roughly midway between the distributions for liars 
and truth-tellers—served as the criterion for inferring the status of the target. 
Specifically, if the target were a liar, the result was defined as a true positive if his 
mean response time lay above the criterion, and as a miss if it lay below it; if the 
target were a truth-teller, the result was defined as a true negative if his mean response 
time lay below the criterion, and as a false positive if it lay above it. We tallied results 
across 30,000 iterations, and expressed them as percentages. Overall percentage 
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accuracy was calculated as the mean of the percentage of true positive and true 
negatives. This method of estimating discrimination can be regarded as assessing the 
accuracy of the TARA when applied to any new individual drawn from exactly the 
same population as that from which TARA performance norms are previously 
derived.  
 Maximal values achieved were high, with overall accuracy exceeding 80%, 
while minimal values achieved were respectable, with overall accuracy around 70% 
(Table 4, upper). In addition, all TARAs showed a bias towards correctly identifying 
truth-tellers (i.e., specificity) at the expense of correctly identifying liars (i.e., 
sensitivity)—arguably a desirable bias for any lie detector to exhibit.
 
Finally, echoing 
earlier findings, the computer-based and paper-and-pencil versions achieved 
somewhat higher levels discrimination than the card-sorting version on the TARA 
completed first. However, roughly equivalent levels of discrimination were achieved 
across all versions on the TARA completed second.  
Discussion 
In Experiment 1a, 1b, and 1c, we tested whether, and to what extent, three 
different versions of the TARA—a lie detector designed to diagnose deception on the 
basis of slower responses Gregg (2007)—could distinguish between the honest and 
dishonest reporting of attitudes towards a consumer product, namely, Marmite
TM
. 
Regardless of which version of the TARA was used—computed-based, paper-and-
pencil, or card-sorting—two clear-cut findings emerged: (a) the same set of 
participants went markedly more slowly when lying about their attitudes than when 
telling the truth about them; and (b) sets of participants who lied about their attitudes 
went markedly more slowly than sets of participants who told the truth about them. 
Thus, across varying formats, the TARA methodology consistently showed promise 
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as an index of falsely expressed attitudes. Moreover, its results were neither strongly 
nor consistently moderated by gender, age, attitude towards Marmite
TM
, or extremity 
of attitude towards Marmite
TM
. Moreover, simulation tests estimated its potential 
accuracy rates to match those of leading lie detectors, such as the CQT and GKT 
(Vrij, 2008).  
Experiment 2 
Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c showed that the TARA methodology worked 
across three different versions. However, they featured only a single attitude object, 
namely, Marmite
TM
. The possibility therefore arises that the effects observed were 
exclusive or particular to that attitude object.  
As mentioned above, Marmite
TM
 is reputedly distinctive in that people are 
alleged by advertisers to have extremely bimodal attitudes towards it. Indeed, the 
patterns of attitudes towards Marmite
TM
 we observed did take broadly bimodal form 
(Figure 2, upper). Might the TARA therefore diagnose lying and truth-telling only 
with respect to objects like Marmite
TM
? We address the question empirically below. 
But before doing so, we make several pertinent points.  
First, although attitudes towards Marmite
TM
 were bimodally distributed in our 
samples, they were hardly devoid of variance. Our samples featured reasonable 
numbers of participants holding mild, moderate, and extreme attitudes towards 
Marmite
TM
, both favorable and unfavorable.  
Second, we took the trouble to investigate empirically in Experiments 1a, 1b, 
and 1c whether such attitudinal variance—specifically, the extremity of attitudes 
towards Marmite
TM
–moderated performance on the TARA. In no case did it do so, 
neither when participants responded honestly, nor when they responded dishonestly. 
In other words, participants who held milder attitudes towards Marmite
TM
 exhibited 
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effects on the TARA equivalent to participants who held more extreme attitudes 
towards Marmite
TM
. Thus, no evidence emerged to support concerns that the TARA 
only works when attitudes are extreme, when it could readily have emerged in three 
separate experiments.  
Third—and more pragmatically—if people lack any attitude towards an 
object—that is, if they are wholly indifferent to it, then there is no attitude for them 
either to tell the truth or to lie about. Accordingly, the TARA would have no 
application in such cases. Hence, that it should not operate in such cases can hardly be 
a criticism of it. The only concern would be this: if, in a given sample, many members 
were indifferent to an attitude object, then many bogus TARA results might 
contaminate that sample, and thus impair its diagnosticity. In mitigation, however, it 
should be pointed out that even if indifference were the modal attitude, which is 
hardly guaranteed, such a modal attitude would still be but a fraction of the total 
distribution of attitude, except in very leptokurtic distributions. At any rate, there are 
no a priori grounds to believe that indifference should systematically bias the TARA 
towards signaling honesty or dishonesty, but only that it would add random error. 
Nonetheless, we judged it prudent to test whether the TARA could diagnose 
honesty and dishonesty with respect to another attitudinal object, one that—although 
still being unlikely to arouse social desirability bias so that ground truth could be 
presumed—was liable to yield a less bimodal distribution of liking and disliking, and 
which was also better known. For this purpose, we chose a popular everyday product, 
still consumable but more generic: coffee. 
In addition, we administered both TARAs, honest and dishonest, not once, but 
twice to participants in Experiment 2, in the same counterbalanced order. The purpose 
of doing so was to assess the impact on TARA performance of immediate prior 
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experience with the TARA. We wondered: would the opportunity to familiarize 
oneself with, and gain practice at, lying and telling the truth on the TARA, reduce or 
eliminate any subsequent TARA effect (assuming that we could replicate the initial 
TARA effect)? Thus, the study tested not only the generality of the TARA across 
topic, but also its persistence over time. Furthermore, to the extent that TARA effects 
did persist, the design offered a means of estimating split-half reliability. 
Method 
Procedure and materials. For Experiment 2, we opted to use the paper-and-
pencil version of the TARA. Accordingly, the procedure was identical to that reported 
in Experiment 1b, except that five different experimenters rather than the same one 
ran the study (to expedite its completion). The only difference in the materials was 
that (a) the word “coffee” was substituted for the word “Marmite” in the experimental 
booklets, and (b) two additional pages were added to the end of the booklet, to add a 
second pair of honest and dishonest TARAs (i.e., Pair II), to the first pair (i.e., Pair I). 
To prevent item-specific practice, and make items appears random—but also 
maximize the comparability of the two pairs—the vertical order in which 48 items 
appeared was inverted for Pair II relative to Pair I. 
Participants. All 73 participants were volunteers whom the experimenters 
approached personally to take part. Most participants were undergraduate students 
from the University of Southampton campus but several were older (MAGE = 30.2; 
SDAGE = 12.6). The sample was roughly balanced for gender (44% male). 
Results 
Data cleaning and reduction. In Experiment 2, 13 participants (18%) were 
excluded for one or more of the following reasons: 7 for rating coffee at the scale 
midpoint; 1 for being a non-native English speaker; 6 for making too many errors in 
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any TARA; and 2 for failing to complete the experimental booklet. Again, mean 
response time to classify statements (i.e., total time taken / 48) served as the index of 
TARA performance. As before, no penalties for classification errors were applied, as 
they did not correlate significantly negatively with mean response time, either in 
Experiment 2I (rHONEST[58]= .11, p = .40; rDISHONEST[58] = .49, p < .0005), in 
Experiment 2II (rHONEST[58]= .22, p = .10; rDISHONEST[58] = .42, p < .001).  
Attitudes towards coffee.  As expected, ratings of coffee exhibited a more 
normal distribution than ratings of Marmite
TM
 (see Figure 2, bottom). In particular, 
the modal value (+1) lay near to the center of the distribution, and, unlike in 
Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c, the two most extreme values (+3, -3) were less frequent 
than the next two most extreme values (+2, -2). Recalling earlier findings for 
Marmite
TM
, participants showed no overall evaluative bias for or against coffee, t(59) 
= 1.12, p = .27.  
Within-subject differences.  
Overall effects. As predicted, the same set of participants took significantly 
longer to complete the TARA when lying about their attitudes towards coffee than 
when telling the truth about them (both ps < .0005; see Table 1, lower), both for Pair 
I, Pair II, and the average of the two. Thus, the “attitudinal” TARA also worked with 
respect to a new and more familiar consumer product that elicited a more normal 
distribution of liking and disliking. Accuracy rates were comparable to those in 
Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c. Effect sizes ranged between being about half the size of, 
to being about one-third the size of, those obtained in Experiment 1b.  
In addition, the within-subject difference was significantly lower for Pair II 
than for Pair I, t(59) = 4.28, p < .001, with the significant reduction for successive 
dishonest TARAs, t(59) = 6.06, p < .0001, being about twice the size of that for 
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successive honest TARAs, t(59) = 3.43, p < .001. This suggests that prior experience 
with the TARA, whether lying or telling the truth, may somewhat reduce its 
diagnosticity. Nonetheless, even if aggregate performance shifted across consecutive 
TARAs, individual performance exhibited substantial consistency: honest TARAs, 
dishonest TARAs, and the within-subject difference between them, yielded large 
split-half reliabilities of r = .79, r = .90, and r = .77 respectively.
3
 Such consistency 
attests to the intraindividual robustness of TARA effects. 
Moderation tests. Once again, we tested whether gender, age, attitude towards 
target, and extremity of attitude moderated average response speed for both the honest 
and dishonest TARAs, as well as for the within-subject difference between them 
(Table 2, lower). Overall, more evidence of significant moderation emerged here than 
emerged in Experiments 1a 1b, and 1c. Greater age predicted slower responses on all 
indices. Unexpectedly, gender also emerged as a moderator: being male predicted 
significantly slower responses on all indices. Some inconsistent signs also emerged 
that attitude towards target, and the extremity of that attitude, significantly moderated 
TARA performance. The most consistent finding here, however, was that more 
extreme attitudes predicted slower performance on the ho est TARA.  
Between-subject differences. 
Overall effects. Sets of participants who lied about their attitudes towards 
coffee took longer to complete the TARA than matched sets of participants who told 
the truth about them (Table 3, lower). For the TARA completed first, whether in Pair I 
and Pair II, the between-subject difference was significant and substantial; for the 
TARA completed second, the corresponding between-subject differences were still 
significant, but less substantial. Averaging across both pairs, the between-subject 
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differences persisted. Again, effect sizes ranged between being about half the size of, 
to being about one-third the size of, those obtained in Experiment 1b. 
Percentage accuracy. As in Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c, the between-subject 
diagnosticity of the TARA was expressed—by means of an odd-one-out statistical 
simulation—in terms of true positives (identified liars), false positives (misidentified 
truth-tellers), true negatives (identified truth-tellers), and false negatives 
(misidentified liars). For the TARA completed first, Pair I values approached the high 
levels seen in Study 1b. Pair II values for the TARA completed first, and Pair I values 
for the TARA completed second, were somewhat reduced. Pair II values for the 
TARA completed second exceeded chance only modestly. Averaging across both Pair 
I and Pair II, intermediate values were obtained, again about one-half to two-thirds of 
those obtained in Experiment 1b (starting the count at chance: 50% accurate). In 
addition, the TARA showed the same bias towards specificity at the expense of 
sensitivity. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, we tested whether, and to what extent, the TARA could 
distinguish between the honest and dishonest reporting of attitudes towards a new 
consumer product—namely, coffee—lest the results of Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c be 
specific to the use of Marmite
TM
. Overall, Experiment 2 replicated earlier effects, both 
within-subject and between-subject, testifying to its generality. However, both the 
magnitude of the effects obtained and the diagnosticity of the TARA were affected by 
whether the TARA was being completed for the first or for the second time: 
performance levels approached those of Experiment 1b in the former case but fell 
behind them in the latter. Thus, prior experience with the TARA attenuated effects. In 
addition, Experiment 2 yielded some indications that TARA performance could be 
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moderated by extraneous variables. However, apart from age—known to correlate 
inversely with reaction time—the effects observed were inconsistent (attitude towards 
target), lay in an unexpected direction (extremity of attitude), or were likely due to 
chance (gender).  
General Discussion 
Overall, the “attitudinal” TARA tested here showed promise as a lie detection 
tool for use in survey research. Its effects generalized either well or reasonably well 
across high-tech and low-tech versions, different attitude objects, and repeated 
administrations.  
We now devote the remainder of this paper to discussing (a) variations in 
effect magnitude observed, and (b) similarities and differences between the TARA 
and another recently developed response speed task designed to assess deception.  
Variations in Effect Magnitude 
Four sources of observed variation in the magnitude of TARA effects merit 
comment: the TARA version used; the attitude object addressed; the demographic 
characteristics of the respondents; and prior experience with the TARA. We deal with 
these below, roughly in turn, but sometimes in tandem. 
 In Experiment 1, depending on the index analyzed, the computer-based and 
paper-and-pencil TARAs either yielded comparable effects (i.e., for the between-
subject comparison), or one slightly outdid the other (i.e., for within-subject effects 
and accuracy estimates). The card-sorting TARA trailed behind somewhat in terms of 
maximal effects obtained. Yet at the same time, the card-sorting TARA yielded more 
robust effects for TARAs administered second. Thus, regardless of how the logic 
underlying the TARA was instantiated, roughly comparable effects emerged across 
the board. 
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 The magnitude of effects observed in Experiment 2, despite all being 
statistically significant, ranged between one-half and two-thirds of those observed in 
Experiment 1a. In both experiments, the paper-and-pencil TARA was administered; 
hence, some other factor or factors must explain the disparity. One explanation is that 
the “attitudinal” TARA—although it works for attitude objects whose evaluations are 
distributed bimodally (i.e., Marmite
TM
) or more normally (i.e., coffee)—nonetheless 
works somewhat better in the former case. An alternative explanation, however, is 
that the samples for Experiment 1b and Experiment 2 accidentally differed in some 
relevant way. 
 Age emerged as a moderator of TARA performance, either some the time 
(Experiment 1) or all of the time (Experiment 2), such that older participants took 
longer to complete the TARA. This finding echoes others from large-scale studies on 
choice reaction times (e.g., Der & Deary, 2006) and implies that age is liable to be a 
demographic confound worth controlling for (cf. Greewald, Nosek, & Banaji 2003). 
Furthermore, older participants showed a larger within-subject difference in 
Experiment 2 (but not in Experiment 1). This being the case—and given that 
participants in Experiment 2 were on average 10 years older than those in Experiment 
1 (especially, Experiment 1b)—one might have expected, if anything, that TARA 
effects would have been larger in Experiment 2. However, they were smaller. Hence, 
age is unlikely to account for the difference in effect size between the experiments. 
 Experiment 2 (but not Experiment 1) also saw an unexpected moderator 
emerge: gender. Contrary to the findings from large-scale research (Der & Deary, 
2006), males completed the TARA more slowly than females. This suggests that the 
participants in Experiment 2 may have been atypical. If so, their atypicality might also 
explain the lower magnitude of effects in Experiment 2. 
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 In neither Experiment 1 nor Experiment 2 did the direction of participants’ 
attitudes towards Marmite
TM
 consistently moderate the size of effects observed. This 
is a reassuring result for an “attitudinal” TARA. However, Experiment 2 (but not 
Experiment 1) did find some evidence that having more moderate or extreme attitudes 
moderated the size of effects observed. Curiously, however, the evidence was at least 
as strong as that having more extreme attitudes slowed down the completion of the 
honest TARA as of the dishonest TARA. One might have imagined finding the 
opposite pattern—that stronger attitudes might have been “truer” and so have 
expedited completion of the honest TARA while retarding completion of the 
dishonest TARA. At all events, the data from neither Experiment 1 nor Experiment 2 
offer any support for this pattern. Overall, then, the “attitudinal” TARA seems to 
detect “little” lies as well as “big” ones. 
 In Experiment 2, the diagnosticity of the TARA pair administered first (i.e., 
Pair I) markedly exceeded that of the TARA pair administered second (i.e., Pair II). 
This would appear to be a liability: experiential acquaintance with the TARA may be 
sufficient to undermine its capacity to distinguish robustly between liars and truth-
tellers. Furthermore, determined practice, including on specific TARAs, might 
undermine that diagnosticity further.  
Note, however, that this liability need not be realized. In practice, the 
“attitudinal” TARA is likely to be administered, often if not nearly always, to 
respondents who are unfamiliar both with the specific TARA being administered, and 
with the TARA methodology itself. It will not be used in forensic settings to decide 
the guilt or innocence of criminal suspects, but rather in research settings to estimate 
the veracity or mendacity of survey respondents.  
Comparing and Contrasting the TARA and the aIAT 
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The issue of guilt or innocence brings us to the Autobiographical IAT (aIAT; 
Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008)—another lie detector relying 
on response speed. It is instructive to compare and contrast the aIAT and TARA. To 
do so, it is useful to relate both to their common “ancestor”: the Implicit Association 
Test (IAT; Carney, Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007; Greenwald et al., 1998), 
designed to be an indirect measure of automatic association between category pairs. 
The IAT works as follows. Respondents classify items—either words or 
pictures—into four categories (A, B, X, and Y). They do so by making either of two 
responses (e.g., left and right) as quickly as they can without making errors. In two 
critical blocks, the assignment rules for categories and responses are switched around. 
Specifically, if respondents go more quickly in one block (e.g., where [A | X → left] & 
[B | Y → right]) than in another (e.g., where [A | Y → left] & [B | X → right]), then 
they are deemed to automatically associate category pairs in one way (i.e., [A ↔ X] & 
[B ↔Y]) rather than another (i.e., [A ↔ Y] & [B ↔ X]). 
The aIAT differs from the IAT, but resembles the TARA, in that respondents 
classify statements, not words or pictures. The aIAT also differs from the IAT, but 
again resembles the TARA, in that respondents classify some statements into the 
categories True and False (specifically, the control statements).  
However, the aIAT and the IAT both differ from the TARA in that, whereas 
they both feature two critical blocks of trials to be compared within-subject, the 
TARA features only a single critical block of trials to be compared between-subject. 
In addition, the aIAT and the IAT both differ from the TARA in that, whereas four 
categories appear in both their critical blocks, only two categories appear in the 
TARA critical block (i.e., True and False). 
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More specifically: in the critical blocks of the aIAT, respondents classify 
control statements into the categories True or False but target statements into the 
categories Innocent or Guilty. In its first critical block, the assignment is [True | Guilty 
→ left] & [False | Innocent → right]; in its second critical block, the assignment is 
[True | Innocent → left] & [False | Guilty → right]. Thus, respondents classify target 
statements on the aIAT in two ways: first, as if they have something to hide. 
Conceptually, therefore, the second critical block loosely corresponds to the TARA 
critical block. On the TARA, all respondents, whether actually responding honestly 
(i.e., “innocent” respondents) or dishonestly (“guilty” respondents), classify target 
statements as if they have nothing to hide. 
The crucial difference is this: whereas all statements on the TARA are 
classified in terms of their truth-value, half the statements on the aIAT—that is, the 
target statements—are classified in terms of their categorical meaning (i.e., just as all 
stimuli on the original IAT are). For example, “I stole the jar of Marmite” would be 
classified under the category “guilty” whereas “I bought the jar of Marmite” would be 
classified under the category “innocent”. This reflect the intended modus operandi of 
the aIAT: it was designed to reflect levels of association between the category pairs 
True and False and the category pairs Guilty or Innocent—levels of association 
assumed to depend in turn on the guilt or innocence of respondents. In contrast, the 
TARA does not rely upon any associations between categories. Instead, it relies—as 
outlined in the introduction section—only on the differential compatibility of 
classification strategies that respondents adopt by virtue of honestly or dishonestly 
classifying target statements in conjunction with accurately classifying control 
statements. 
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How then do the TARA and aIAT compare as potentially cheap, convenient, 
and diagnostic indices of deception, suitable for use in survey research?  
In terms of cheapness, both techniques are indistinguishable, being 
equivalently low-tech. There is no reason to suppose that paper-and-pencil or card-
sorting versions of the aIAT could not also be readily realized.  
In terms of convenience, the TARA exhibits two relevant advantages, one 
arguably desirable and the other arguably decisive. First, the TARA features only one 
block of trials rather than two. Hence, it can be administered slightly more quickly 
and efficiently than the aIAT can. Second, target statements on the TARA are 
classified in terms of truth versus falsity rather than guilt versus innocence. Hence, the 
TARA is far more generally applicable than the aIAT. Indeed, the concepts of guilt or 
innocence simply do not apply in survey research, as no a priori value judgment is 
made about what respondents report, nor are respondents subjects in a criminal 
investigation. For example, how would one even code guilt or innocence with respect 
to attitudes expressed towards Marmite
TM
 or coffee? Thus, the aIAT is primarily 
suited to forensic use, like recent response speed versions of the GKT (e.g., 
Verschuere et al., 2010). The TARA, in contrast, can take more general form, 
including as an “attitudinal” lie detector. 
 Finally, in terms of diagnosticity, both the TARA and aIAT have relative 
advantages and disadvantages. In principle, because the aIAT (like the original IAT) 
relies on the within-subject comparison of response speed, it can partly control for 
idiosyncratic variations in response speed that the TARA cannot (Greenwald et al., 
2003). Second, whereas TARA effects are driven only by a single source of 
incompatibility, present in a single block, aIAT could be driven by two sources of 
incompatibility, each present in either of its pair of blocks. For example, relative to an 
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innocent participant, a guilty participant may proceed both (a) more quickly on the 
block where [True | Guilty → left] & [False | Innocent → right] and (b) more slowly 
on the block where [True | Innocent → left] & [False | Guilty → right]. The 
interactive pattern of results obtained for some studies (Sartori et al., 2008) suggests 
that this is the case. Thus, aIATs may yield comparatively stronger effects. 
Yet the aIAT’s potential diagnostic advantages may not always be realized. To 
understand why, consider what is required to “cheat” the TARA and the aIAT. To 
cheat on the TARA, dishonest respondents must go more quickly; and to do that, they 
must overcome the incompatibility imposed by the task. To cheat on the aIAT, 
however, guilty respondents can adopt either of two tactics: they can go more quickly 
in the block where [True | Innocent → left] & [False | Guilty → right], by again 
overcoming the incompatibility imposed; or they can go more slowly in the block 
where [True | Guilty → left] & [False | Innocent → right], simply by intentionally 
slowing down. Adopting the latter tactic, unavailable on the TARA, is easier than 
adopting the former, as slowing down poses no special challenge (cf. Fiedler & 
Bluemke, 2005). Hence, it is in principle easier to cheat the aIAT than the TARA. 
Moreover, respondents given simple instructions can in practice cheat the aIAT 
(Verschuere, Prati, & De Houwer, 2009). Still, respondents they might not 
spontaneously figure out how to do so in the absence of such instructions (cf. Kim, 
2003). Furthermore, algorithms have recently developed that can distinguish well 
between faked and frank responding on the aIAT (Agosta, Ghirardi, Zogmaister, 
Castiello, & Sartori, 2011; see also Cvencek, Greenwald, Brown, Gray, & Snowden, 
2010), so this may decrease the aIAT’s greater structural susceptibility to fakery. 
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Footnotes 
1
 It should perhaps be clarified that all target statements of one sort [e.g., I am 
male; I am a man; I am a guy], and all target statements of another sort [e.g., I am 
female; I am a woman; I am a lady]—are designed, in each case, to be classified 
identically. That is, target statements of one type are all classified either honestly or 
dishonestly, as a coherent unit, and target statements of another type are all classified 
either dishonestly or honestly, as a coherent unit. The detection of truth-telling or 
deception occurs across sets of items, not between individual items. 
2
 We established this empirically. A separate group of participants (N = 91) 
rated each of the six target statements for how much they agreed or disagreed with 
them (1 = Completely Disagree, 7 = Completely Agree). After reverse-scoring ratings 
for the three items asserting dislike, the degree of internal consistency across all six 
ratings was estimated. The near maximal value obtained (α =.97) implied that the 
target statements were thematically homogeneous, as intended. 
3
 Experiment 1a, whose data consisted of multiple individual response times, 
also afforded the possibility of estimating the internal consistency of the TARA 
blocks. Split-half reliability—the correlation between the average RTs across the first 
24 response times and the average RT across the last 24 response times—was 
respectively r = .76,  r = .69,  and r = .52—for the honest TARA block, the dishonest 
TARA blocks, and the within-subject difference between them, respectively. If the 
split-halves were computed across adjacent pairs of trials (e.g., 1,2,5,6…, on the one 
hand, and 3,4,7,8…, on the other), still higher values were obtained, respectively r = 
.84,  r = .90,  and r = .78. 
4
 The resistance of the primary TARA index to motivational manipulation 
remains to be empirically tested. However, it seems a priori unlikely that TARA 
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effects are solely due to a dearth of motivation: participants in the current research 
strove hard to complete each TARA as quickly and as accurately as they could, and 
with the exception of Experiment 1a, were in the presence of another person who was 
timing them. In addition, external incentives are known to improve performance on 
simpler tasks, but worsen performance on more complex ones (Wickelgren, 1977). To 
the extent that completing a TARA honestly constitutes a simpler task, and 
completing one dishonestly constitutes a more difficult one—as its rationale implies 
and empirical findings confirm—one might expect stronger motivation to exacerbate 
rather than attenuate TARA effects. 
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Table 1 
Within-Subject Analysis for Experiments 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2: Means and Standard 
Deviations of Response Speeds for Honest and Dishonest TARAs, with Inferential 
Statistics, Effect Size, and Percentage Positive for the Difference between Them 
 
 
Index M SD t d % Positive 
 
 
Experiment 1a      
Honest 1029 217 - - - 
    Dishonest 1435 402 - - - 
     Difference 406 318 13.31*  1.28 93% 
      
Experiment 1b      
Honest 1579 322 - - - 
    Dishonest 2090 442 - - - 
     Difference 512 344 10.82* 1.50 98% 
      
Experiment 1c      
Honest 1572 411 - - - 
    Dishonest 2274 604 - - - 
     Difference 702 640 8.43* 1.11 88% 
      
Experiment 2I      
Honest 1539 300 - - - 
    Dishonest 2150 762 - - - 
     Difference 611 568 8.34*  1.09 97% 
      
Experiment 2II      
Honest 1472 310 - - - 
    Dishonest 1888 719 - - - 
     Difference 415 527 6.10* 0.79 90% 
      
Experiment 2I+II      
Honest 1505 296 - - - 
    Dishonest 2019 721 - - - 
     Difference 513 518 7.68* 1.00 93% 
 
 
Note. N = 109 for Experiment 1a. N = 53 for Experiment 1b. N = 59 for Experiment 1c. 
N = 58 for Experiment 2. N = 60 for Experiment 2 in all cases. 
Means and standard deviations are expressed in milliseconds. In Experiment 2, the 
subscript “I” refers to the pair of honest and dishonest blocks administered first, the 
subscript “II” the pair administered second, and “I+II” to their arithmetic average. 
* p < .0001. 
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Table 1 
Experiments 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2: Correlations between (A) Average Response Speed on 
Honest and Dishonest TARAs and Within-Subject Difference between Them and (B) 
Participant Gender, Age, Attitude towards Marmite
TM
, and Extremity of Attitude 
 
 
 
TARA Index 
 
 
Gender 
 
Age 
Attitude 
towards 
Target 
Extremity 
of 
Attitude 
 
 
Experiment 1a     
Honest   .20
*
     .29
**
  -.29
**
       -.04 
    Dishonest .00     .24
**
      -.02 .08 
     Difference       -.14 .11 .18
†
 .12 
     
Experiment 1b     
Honest .18 .15       -.06         -.18 
    Dishonest        .01 .17 .01 -.19 
     Difference       -.16 .08 .07 -.07 
     
Experiment 1c     
Honest .04 .15 .03         -.19 
    Dishonest         -.15   .27
*
          .04         -.21 
     Difference       -.16 .16         -.01         -.07 
     
Experiment 2I     
Honest .30
*
  .23† -.03      .28
*
 
    Dishonest .33
*
  .33
**
 .16      .23† 
     Difference .28
*
 .25
*
  .22†      .17 
     
Experiment 2II     
Honest .29
*
       .21 -10 .36
**
 
    Dishonest  .32
**
 .29
*
 .12     .16 
     Difference .26
*
 .27
*
  .23†     .01 
     
Experiment 2I+II     
Honest .34
**
 .28
*
 .11 .26
*
 
    Dishonest   .32
**
 .28
*
 .06        .24† 
     Difference .34
**
 .38
*
 .09        .25
*
 
 
 
Note. N = 109 for Experiment 1a. N = 53 for Experiment 1b. N = 59 for Experiment 1c. 
N = 58 for Experiment 2.  
In Experiment 2, the subscript “I” refers to the pair of honest and dishonest blocks 
administered first, the subscript “II” the pair administered second, and “I+II” to their 
arithmetic average. 
†< .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. 
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Table 3 
Between-Subject Analysis for Experiments 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2: Mean Response Speed 
for Honest and Dishonest TARAs, with Inferential Statistics and Effect Size for the 
Different between Them 
 
 
TARA Order Honest Dishonest Difference t d 
 
 
Experiment 1a      
First 1010 1542 532 7.83
***
 1.87 
    Second 1050 1337 286 5.31
***
 1.06 
      
Experiment 1b      
First 1552 2215 663 6.14
***
 1.91 
    Second 1607 1971 364 3.58
***
 1.00 
      
Experiment 1c      
First 1552 2370 818 5.66
***
 1.57 
    Second 1591 2174 583 4.74
***
 1.36 
      
Experiment 2I      
First 1537 2303 766 5.45
***
 1.63 
    Second 1540 1986 446 2.84
**
 .99 
      
Experiment 2II      
First 1478 2013 534 3.74
***
 1.12 
    Second 1466 1754 287 2.02
*
 0.68 
      
Experiment 2I+II      
First 1507 2158 650 4.74
***
 1.41 
    Second 1503 1870 367 2.51
*
 0.86 
 
 
Note. In Experiment 1a, alternate ns = 57 vs. 52. In Experiment 1b, alternate ns = 27 vs.  
26. In Experiment 1c, alternate ns = 29 vs. 30. In Experiment 2, alternate ns = 29 vs. 31. 
Means are expressed in milliseconds. Values of t and d are in all cases adjusted to 
take account of the heterogeneity of variance between honest and dishonest blocks, 
which is sometimes significant (e.g., in Experiment 1a) and sometimes not (e.g., in 
Experiment 1c). In Experiment 2, the subscript “I” refers to the pair of honest and 
dishonest blocks administered first, the subscript “II” the pair administered second, 
and “I+II” to their arithmetic average. 
  * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Table 4 
Discrimination Analysis for Experiments 1a, 1b, 1c, and 2: Percentages for True 
Positive, False Positives, True Negatives, and False Negatives, and Overall 
Accuracy 
 
 
TARA 
Order 
True 
Positive 
False 
Positive 
True 
Negatives 
False 
Negatives 
Overall 
Accuracy 
 
 
Experiment 1a      
First 73 14 86 27 80 
    Second 63 27 73 37 68 
      
Experiment 1b      
First 81 11 89 19 85 
    Second 67 26 74 33 71 
      
Experiment 1c      
First 63 21 79 37 71 
    Second 62 16 84 38 73 
      
Experiment 2I      
First 71 11 89 29 80 
    Second 45 19 81 55 63 
      
Experiment 2II      
First 55 21 79 45 67 
    Second 48 32 68 52 58 
      
Experiment 2I+II      
First 65 17 83 35 74 
    Second 52 26 74 48 63 
 
 
Note. In Experiment 1a, alternate ns = 57 vs. 52. In Experiment 1b, alternate ns = 27 vs.  
26. In Experiment 1c, alternate ns = 29 vs. 30. In Experiment 2, alternate ns = 29 vs. 31. 
In Experiment 2, the subscript “I” refers to the pair of honest and dishonest blocks 
administered first, the subscript “II” the pair administered second, and “I+II” to their 
arithmetic average. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 41 of 44
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Detecting Lies about Attitudes 42 
Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Images of the materials used in to run TARAs designed to detect deception in 
attitudes towards Marmite
TM
. The top image depicts the computer-based version 
(Experiment 1a), the middle image the paper-and-pencil version (Experiment 1b), and 
the bottom image the card-sorting version (Experiment 1c).  
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Figure 2 
 
     
Distributions of attitudes towards Marmite
TM
 (1 = I hate Marmite, 7 = I love Marmite) 
in Experiments 1a, 1b, 1c (top of figure), and Experiment 2 (bottom of figure). 
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Appendix 
Stimuli: Categories and Items 
Control Statements (All Experiments)       
True    False 
(1) ○ is a circle  (4) ○ is a triangle 
 
(2) ∆ is a triangle  (5) ∆ is a square 
 
(3) □ is a square  (6) □ is a circle 
 
 
Target Statements (Experiments 1a, 1b, and 1c)      
True (or False)  False (or True) 
(7) I like Marmite  (10) I dislike Marmite 
(8) Marmite is yummy (11) Marmite is yucky 
(9) Marmite tastes good (12) Marmite tastes bad 
 
Target Statements (Experiment 2)       
True (or False)  False (or True) 
(7) I like coffee  (10) I dislike coffee 
(8) Coffee is yummy  (11) Coffee is yucky 
(9) Coffee tastes good  (12) Coffee tastes bad 
 
Stimuli: Pseudo-random order of items 
1,12,5,7,6,10,2,8,4,11,3,9,1,10,5,9,3,11,2,7,4,12,6,8,5,10,1,9,3,11,4,8,2,10,6,7,5,12,1,
8,6,12,4,7,2,11,3,9 
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